Interpreting any statute, first and foremost, requires paying heed to the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the plain language of the statuteSamuelsen, as president ofLocal 100, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York v New York City Tr. Auth. et al, 2012 NY Slip Op 08780, AppellateDivision, First Department
Local 100, Transport Workers Union ofGreater New York [Union] is the exclusive collective bargaining representativeof approximately 32,000 workers employed by various subordinate bodies andaffiliates of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority. One ofits component units is the New York City Transit Authority (TA).
The Manhattan and Bronx SurfaceTransit Authority (MaBSTOA) was created by the Legislature in 1962 after theCity of New York seized several privately owned and operated bus lines throughits eminent domain power.*
Public Authorities Law §1203-a, inpertinent part, provides: "[MaBSTOA] officers and employees shall notbecome, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the [TA] and shall notacquire civil service status or become members of the New York City Employees'Retirement System" (NYCERS). Although this arrangement was originally intended to operate "for a temporary period"(Public Authorities Law 1203-a[2]), it has continued until the present. Although the two authorities have remainedseparate legal entities, they nevertheless developed, as a practical matter,functional overlap such as sharing common office facilities and a personneldepartment.
Certain differences, however, weremaintained with respect to personnel matters. For example, the terms ofemployment for both TA and MaBSTOA employees were governed by a collective bargainingagreement [CBA], with certain exceptions such as the CBA providing that any layoffs of MaBSTOA employees would occur in reverse orderof seniority, based upon date of hire. However there was no similar provision in thatagreement concerning TA workers as the layoff of TA workers was controlled bythe §§80 and 81 of the Civil Service Law. Another difference: set out in the CBA addressed “job selection.” MaBSTOA employees could pick only jobs associated with the buslines operated by MaBSTOA while TA employees could pick only jobs associated withbus lines and subways operated by TA.
In December 2002, the TA and MaBSTOAexecuted a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Union (MOU) thatmodified the CBA to provide for the consolidation of MaBSTOA and TA surfacetransit operations whereby "The Authority and the Union agree to theelimination of the artificial distinction between MaBSTOA and the TransitAuthority….” To effectuate the MOU, theparties established a joint job pick procedure that allowed MaBSTOA and TAemployees, subject to certain limitations, to "pick into" TA jobs andTA employees to "pick into" MaBSTOA jobs in accordance with a single,integrated seniority list, known as the "Consolidated SeniorityList."
Asserting that this directly violatesthe prohibition in Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b) against MaBSTOAemployees becoming, "for any purpose, employees of the city or of the[TA], the Union alleged that "as a result of" the MOU and theconsolidation agreement, "employees of MaBSTOA are, for almost allpurposes, employees of [the TA]. The Union further alleged that “MaBSTOAemployees regularly work in [TA] facilities” and other than not having civilservice status or participating in a different pension system, “MaBSTOAemployees working for [TA] are for all purposes indistinguishable from [TA]employees."
The Union sought a judgment declaringthat:
1. “No MaBSTOA employee may be treatedas an employee of the TA for any purpose, and that the MOU and consolidationagreement are void and unenforceable to the extent that they have effectively madeemployees of MaBSTOA into employees of the TA.” and
2. Prohibiting the MaBSTOA fromtaking any action in accordance with the 2002 MOU and 2003 consolidationagreement that is prohibited under the Public Authorities Law, or thatadversely affects the employment of any employee of MaBSTOA.
Supreme Court dismissed the Union’scomplaint “for failure to state a cause of action.” The Appellate Division reversed thelower court’s ruling “on the law.”
As to Supreme Court’s finding that theUnion’s compliant “failed to state a cause of action because nothing in the MOUor consolidation agreement indicated that MaBSTOA employees would gain civilservice status or become members of NYCERS,” the Appellate Division explainedthat “[i]n interpreting any statute, we are required, first and foremost, to payheed to the intent of the Legislature, as reflected by the plain language ofthe text,” citing Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577.
In addition, said the court,"[i]n construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort mustbe had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have adefinite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is noroom for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from thatmeaning."
Noting that a plaintiff’s pleading isto be afforded a liberal construction, the Appellate Division held that “thefacts alleged in the complaint are to be accepted as true, and plaintiff is tobe accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference,” citing Leon vMartinez, 84 NY2d 83.
In the words of the court “… thelanguage we are required to interpret is as follows: ‘[MaBSTOA] officers andemployees shall not become, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the[TA] and shall not acquire civil service status or become members of [NYCERS]’(Public Authorities Law 1203-a[3][b]). In our view, this plainly means thatthree separate prohibitions apply to MaBSTOA employees: (1) that they ‘shallnot become, for any purpose,’ employees of the TA; and (2) that they shall notacquire civil service status; and (3) that they shall not become members of theNYCERS. Accordingly, we agree with the Union that, to the extent that the MOUand consolidation agreement, by merging many of the policies of the twoauthorities, such as probationary employment rules, disciplinary rules, andsick-leave rules, transform MaBSTOA employees into employees of the TA, theagreements violate the first prohibition.”
The Appellate Division rejected the City Transit Authority’s argument that "[t]he plain and obvious meaning of the 'for anypurpose' language is to ensure that a MaBSTOA employee cannot, simply by virtueof employment by MaBSTOA, even in a contractually agreed upon commingled workforce, acquire civil service status or membership in NYCERS."
The most glaring problem with thisinterpretation, said the court, is that “it is decidedly not what the statutesays.” Rather, said the Appellate Division, “[t]he way the provision is written,the ‘and’ creates a separation between the ‘for any purpose’ clause and therest of the sentence. It does not signal a modification to the ‘for anypurpose’ clause or in any way refer back to it. Furthermore, defendants'interpretation renders the first prohibition superfluous, a result which ‘is tobe avoided,’ [citing] Matter of Branford House v Michetti, 81 NY2d 681.”
In other words, said the court,“defendants argue that if a MaBSTOA employee cannot, under any circumstances,be subject to the Civil Service Law or participate in NYCERS, they simplycannot be considered TA ‘employees,’ rendering the first clause meaningless ifnot considered in the manner they urge. This approach is too narrow, for itpays no heed to the notion that different people working under the sameemployer can be classified differently.”
"In other words, not every employee in an organization is similarlysituated. Here, the statute recognizes that MaBSTOA workers could become sointegrated into the TA organization that they could be seen as TA employees,albeit without the protections of the Civil Service Law and the benefit ofNYCERS participation. We simply discern nothing in the statutory language whichconfirms, as the dissent insists, that Civil Service Law protection is the distinguishing'or hallmark' quality of TA employment."
The majority, in response to a commentin the dissent, also observed that its approach was not in conflict with otherprovisions in the Public Authorities Law that might be interpreted asencouraging some standardization of the two agencies' operations.
Agreeing with the Union’sinterpretation of Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b), the Appellate Divisionheld that complaint sufficiently alleged facts establishing that the MOU andconsolidation agreement had the effect of conferring on MaBSTOA workersqualities of "employment" by the TA, it ruled that Supreme Court“erred in dismissing the complaint as not having stated a cause of action.”
* MaBSTOA became a subsidiary corporation of the TA.
The decision is posted on the Internetat:
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