North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. ofHuman Rights, 2012 NY Slip Op 04668, Court of Appeals
Is a public school district an "education corporationor association" within the meaning of Executive Law §296(4)? If it is an “education corporation orassociation,” then the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) hasjurisdiction to investigate complaints filed against public school districts underthat provision. Otherwise it does not. The Court of Appeals decided “not.”
The case arose when a number of public school students filed complaints with the SDHR claiming that their respective schooldistricts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" barred by §296(4)of the Executive Law, the "Human Rights Law," by permitting theirharassment on the basis of race and/or disability.
The school districts involved filed Article 78 petitionsseeking a writ of prohibition* barring the SDHRfrom investigating the complaints on the ground that a public school districtis not an "education corporation or association" as contemplated byExecutive Law §296(4).**
The Appellate Division concluded that as a school districtis a "municipal corporation" and therefore a "publiccorporation" under the General Construction Law, it could not be an"education corporation" within the meaning of Executive Law §296(4)]. However, the Court of Appeals, noting that this “approach is a legitimateone,” decided that there was some problem in SDHR's relying on the GeneralConstruction Law because the provision at issue in the Executive Law wasenacted 15 years prior to General Construction Law §§65 and 66.
The Court, however, said that it did not need to addresswhether the General Construction Law is applicable here as there was anindependent basis, supported by legislative history of Tax Law §4(6), for itsconclusion that a public school district is not an "education corporationor association."
The Court of Appeals said that the legislative historysurrounding the enactment of Tax Law §4(6), in concert with the circumstancesunder which the Legislature transferred the term "education corporation orassociation" from Tax Law §4(6) to Executive Law §296(4), “bespeaks theLegislature's intention that the term was to have the same meaning in theExecutive Law as it did in former Tax Law §4(6).” Moreover, said the court, the use of thephrase "non-sectarian" was plainly included in Executive Law 296(4) to carve out an exception for parochial schools, while reserving for theSDHR the jurisdiction to investigate §296(4) complaints against private,non-sectarian education corporations or associations.
The Court then noted that “Public school districts aredifferent from private, non-sectarian institutions and fall outside the purviewof the SDHR's jurisdiction relative to §296(4) claims … [as] a public schooldistrict receives tax-exempt status by virtue of the fact that it is public, sothere would never be any need for it to 'hold itself out to the public tobe non-sectarian' as, say, a private school."
The fact that the SDHR did not have jurisdiction to considerthe students’ complaints did not mean that they did not have a forum in whichto seek relief. The Court said that “In addition to potential remedies underfederal law, public school students may file a complaint with the Commissionerof Education (see Education Law §310).”
Further, said the court, in 2010, the Legislature enactedthe "Dignity for All Students Act," establishing article 2 of theEducation Law, designed "to afford all [public school] students anenvironment free of any harassment that substantially interferes with theireducation, regardless of the basis of the harassment, and free ofdiscrimination based on actual or perceived race, color, weight, nationalorigin, ethnic group, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, orsex," commenting that while SDHR lauded this legislation by noting that it"addresses a myriad of harassment and discrimination issues that arisewithin a school context and its goals comport with the goals of the [HumanRights Law]," noticeably absent from SDHR’s correspondence was anyindication that the Division had previously handled similar claims of thatnature arising in public schools.***
The Court’s conclusion: Because a public school district isnot an "education corporation or association" under Executive Law §296(4), the SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaints filed bythe students in these appeals.
* A writ of prohibition, oneof the ancient writs under English Common Law, is an order issued by a highertribunal barring a lower tribunal prohibiting the litigationfrom going forward because the lower tribunal lacks jurisdiction to considerthe matter before it.
**Executive Law § 296 (4) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]tshall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education corporation orassociation which holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exemptfrom taxation pursuant to … [RPTL Article 4] … to permit the harassment of anystudent or applicant, by reason of his race … [or] disability …."
***The Court of Appeals referred to a letter from New York State Div. ofHuman Rights, dated July 22, 2010, and included in the Bill Jacket for Chapter482 of the Laws of 2010, in support of this statement.
The decision is posted on theInternet at:
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